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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments tha t  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
t o  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The  central purpose is t o  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is tha t  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims t o  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work. the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than i t  was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts tha t  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions tha t  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought t o  address now are much more clearly defined. The  theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The  list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-sdlving routines within b;_3iil.m firms; the industry-le .I e$lderrc- :I = %try, Z Y ~ L  and 
sue-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regd,ding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The  philosophy of this project 
is tha t  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant t o  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tion; learn search, ? J s n t ;  second, the economic analogues of 'natural s~ lec t ion '  Sv w'lich inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have Oif;E;ez: 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
Network Externalities and Path Dependent 
Consumer Preferences 
Max Keilbach* 
Abstract 
Commodities of high tecl~nological level play an increasingly important 
role in the economy. The nlarket of these commodities can exhibit net- 
work externalities if different standards compete. This is due to the fact 
that the nlarket of these technologies is linked to the market of its co- 
products. Network externalities engender positive feedback on the market 
i.e. the higher the market sha.re of a certain technology, the higher the 
demand for it. The present paper suggests a flexible formal model of the 
dynamics of these markets. This approach allows for identification the 
dynamic behaviour of markets under different hypotheses concerning be- 
haviour of producers and consumers. It makes explicit the role of network 
externalities on markets that exhibit increasing returns. 
1 Introduction 
Commodities of high technological level play an increasingly imporant role in 
the economy. This holds for coilsumption goods, where demand has increasingly 
shifted towards high-tech products, but also for investment goods where substi- 
tutlcm It~sds to an increasing investmen" in a~mplex productio!l facilit;~.; Thc 
markets of these investment goods and/or of durable consumer goods (let us de- 
note it complex technologies) can exhibit different behaviour compared to  markets 
'Dept. of Econometrics, Sekr. FR 6-5, T U  Berlin, Franklinstr. 28/29, D-10587 Berlin and 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, A-2361 Laxenburg. I a m  indebted to  Yuri 
Kaniovski, Giovanni Dosi and Martin Posch for helpful comments. 
of goods of daily consumption (goods with a low level of technology like e.g. food 
or clothing).' A main difference between these two types of goods being that 
the first very often require some kind of complementary investment that puts the 
technology to worlc. Think e.g. of training costs or some linked product like 
computer software. The market of complex technologies is linked to some extend 
to the market of co-products i.e. prices and ease of acces to co-products can be 
an important variable to influence choice if different technologies (different stan- 
dards) of comparable performance coexist. Economically spoken the consequence 
is twofold: 
Once a buyer has chosen a certain technology (and realized some co-in- 
vestment) it is probable tha,t he will stick to it since the co-investment is 
experienced as sunk costs. 
The demand stucture of a potential byuer is - via the "co-market" (the 
market of complementary goods) - linked to the demand structure of others. 
Hence the market of conlplex technologies exhibits network externalities. 
Hence we encounter phenomena that we know from another market, the market 
of telecommunication. But, unlike these markets, in the case of non-telecommu- 
ilication complex technologies there is not a physical network but a "taciturn 
network". Let us call this an investment network. Such networks can exhibit 
the same characteristics as the - well studied - market of telecommunication2. 
If one technology (one standard) dominates the market its co-products can be 
expected to be cheaper and easier to obtain. Moreover we can expect that the 
variety a,mong co-products is bigger and thus more attractive for a new buyer3. 
Hence there is an incentive to join this network since it can be expected to entail 
a higher user-value4. 
'Arthur  et al. a i d  Daz~zd introduced this argument into the economic discussion. See e.g. 
[3, 5, 121 
"ee Callon [8] or Capello [9] for a discussion of this issue. Research in the field of network 
externaljties has beell stimulated by a paper by Rohlfs [2n]. It is probably due to this paper that 
the resc-:t.rc!l 1 1 .  ne:w~,.l: econoinics has .~iainly foc~ssec 91; t.elecommunicatiori markets. Ye:,, 
what has been said wit,li respect to these markets should also hold for investment networks. 
However a systeinatical analysis of markets where network externalities exist is still to be done. 
3See also the dicussioil in Iiatz/Shapiro [17] 
41<atz/Shapiro [17, 181 dealt with the question of network exernalities when the market 
exhibits investnlent networks. Their studies were based on a comparative static approach 
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As an outcome of this "market failure", the dynamics of a market of such 
conlplex technologies can be expected to be fundamentally different to L'classical 
markets". The following section describes the market dynamics more detailed 
and presents the model. In the subsequent section this approach is illustrated 
with for a, limited number of goods. 
2 Evolution of Markets when Network Exter- 
nalities are present 
2.1 Decision Process under Existence of Network Exter- 
nalit ies 
Suppose a market that is characterized by investment networks. On this market 
several types of tech~lologies compete that can all fulfil the same task but have 
different technological characteristics, hence they work with di-ferent standards5. 
\?Then a potential buyer is deciding which type of technology to purchase they look 
at its relative price, at its nlarket share and at the availability of its co-products. 
Suppose at a, certa.in time instant tlie market is in a situation such that all 
competiilg teclinologies have the s a n e  market share and are sold at the same price. 
We would expect a, potentia.1 buyer to be indifferent. Maybe he is indifferent, he 
then might make his decision simply by random. Or maybe he prefers one of the 
technologies, for which the reasons can be manifold: maybe he prefers a certain 
special characteristic, a friend might have recommended to do so because he uses 
the same technology etc. Due to this manifoldness of influences on his decision 
the outcome of this process (his choice) appears random to us6. 
The consequence of his decision is twofold. First, the market share of the 
product ha.s changed. This increases the market of the co-products what makes 
them easier available. This again increases the probability that a next buyer 
chooses a unit of the same technology. Hence via the market of the co-products 
we can expect a positive feedback on the market of tech~ologies Second, the  
involving the assumption of rational expectations. The present paper suggests a different 
approach in that the model is inl~erently dynamic and the assumption of rationality is not 
involved. 
5Think e.g. of different computer systems, of digital cassette recorders (DAT and DCC- 
systems) or - 011 another scale - different energy providing systems (see e.g. R. Cowan [ lo]) .  
'For a similar argument see Arthtrr [3] 
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producers that are now confronted with the new market share might change the 
product-price. Several reasons can play a role in that regard. Maybe they use 
their advantage on the market to increase the price of their products or they are 
confronted with different costs7. The way firms act influences the behaviour of 
the customers. If - due to  the actions of the producers - the relative price of 
a product is cha~iging, the propensity to  buy that product is changing as well. 
Direction and extend of the change depends on the way the consumers react 
toward price change ( the price-elasticity). Hence, with respect to prices, we can 
expect both, negative or positive feedbackss. Of course in the case of network 
externalities this feedbacli might be traded off by the market share itself (see 
discussion below). 
However, even if the marliet share of a product is higher and its price is lower, 
there is still a positrive willingness to pay for other products since they differ in 
soille characteristics. The next buyer, faced with the same decision problem as 
described above, might choose a product that is more expensive. This might be 
due to  the reasons given al~ove or simply because he does not like t o  do what the 
majority doesg. Thus - again - the decision is of random nature. 
2.2 The Model 
Suppose a market where I< 2 2 tecl~nologies (standards) compete. Denote each 
of the j)ossible choices ck, I; = (1 ,2 , .  . . , I< ) ,  where ck denote technologies. Each 
technology ck is produced by exactly one firm, hence we have I{ firms. 
Suppose we have perfect correlation between the market of the technologies 
and the masket of the ~ o - ~ r o d u c t s ' ~ .  Hence we can limit ourselves to  an analysis 
of the market share of the base-technology itself. Let nfk be the number of units 
of ck in the market a t  t .  Denote sfk = nfkl c:=, n: the market share of ck a t  t ime 
t ,  t = (1 ,2 , .  . .). Suppose the price p: of ck at t is a function of its market share 
' C  
-,.,ee a!.>.- ! ; i ~  cii~cussion 111 Dosi~I<anzovskz [19j ar~r.  Ussi et al. [14]. 
'This issue lias been discussed in a number of papers. See e.g. Arthur [3, 51, David [ll] or 
Dosi/Iianiouski 1131. 
'His motivatiotl migh be a "search for diversity". See the discussion in Dosi/Ii7aniouski, [13]. 
"Tliis implies that a certain t,echnology cannot use co-products that fit a different standard. 
This assumptio~l is straightforward for all types of technical co-products. The correlation can 
be less than one in the case of human skills. 
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where f ( - )  is a response function of firms with respect to market share.". In the 
case of  letw work externalities the demand of a potential consumer (the consumer 
that buys next, hence at t + 1) depends on the price of the product at t - which 
is a function of the market share - but also on the market share a t  t itself. This 
is specified in the following demand function 
where t is not chronological time but defined by the sequential moments of buying. 
It should be noted, that a number of possible variables that can have an influence 
on the choice - like different technological characeristics or influences of friends - 
are not included in this demand function. Equation 2 is homogenous of degree a 
in s i  and p in pi and allows for substitution in terms of demand between market 
share and price. Given a certain market share at t we can determine the price 
via equation (1) (given that we kno~v this function) thus, the absolute demand 
(or revealed preference) by the nest buyer. The relative propensity of buying a 
certain product at time t is given by the relatiue demand function or preference 
function which is a vector function whose k-th coordinate is: 
t Dk (si) t t t dk(s ) = , t , where s = (sl, s,, . . . , sK) .  
D;(S;) 
(3) 
i= 1 
Suppose t11a.t the prohability that a potential buyer purchases a certain technol- 
ogy equals his relative preference for this product. Then function (3) specifies 
the conditional probabilities of choosing technology ck given the current market 
shares of all technologies (i.e. given vector st)',. Define a I<-dimensional random 
vector that is independent in t ,  ,Bt(s) of which the k-th coordinate P;(s) is 1 with 
probability dk(s) ,  k = (1 ,2 , .  . . , I<). The evolution of the market shares can now 
be described as13 
1 where 11 is the initial number of goods in the market, i.e. n = n: + n i  + . . . + nK. 
Lel d(s j = (dl ( s ) ,  d2(5). . . . , dIi(s)). Then, expanding equation (4) with d(s': 
"This approach was also cllosen by Dosi/Iianiouski [13] and Dosi, Errnolieu and Iianiouski 
[I41 
"The concept of function 3 is very closely related to the notion of allocation function used 
by Arthzlret al.. See [5, 13, 141. 
13See [5, 13, 141. 
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yields 
Since E ( P ( s ) )  = d ( s )  we ha.ve 
Consequently, the system (5) on average shifts from a point s at  t on -& [d(s) - s]. 
i.e. the limit points of the system (if any) belong to the roots of d ( s )  - s.14 
Once the choice is made the next agent is confronted with a new market 
share, hence he has a different preference structure and the same process applies 
iteratively. Section 3 will ~llodel this process explicitely. 
3 Dynamics of markets under different pricing 
policies 
So far the model has beell formulated on a general level. In this section we 
are going to  present an illustration of the market dynamics based on different 
specifications of the cost function. This will be done for three commodities ( I< = 
3). if'e are going to  illustrate the approach as follows: 
Prices clepe~lcl on the pricing policies of the firms. We consider two cases: 
the case when firms sell their products at  average costs and experience 
sinking average costs with marl<et share and the case when firms are using 
price policy to  increase profits. 
For each of the two cases we are going to show the relative demand func- 
tion for three goods under two different (exemplary) price elasticities. Given 
these parameter constellations, the evolution of the market and the converg- 
ing behaviour of market shares is discussed. This is done either formally 
or by n~ :-t,>. of si~liuiatinil studies !); l~ed on Polva urn proceqsss which are 
described In the following section. 
14For a detailed analysis of the convergence behaviour of a system of this type see Arthur, 
Errnolieu and I<aniouski [7]. 
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3.1 Polya-Urn Scllemes as a Paradigm for Modelling the 
Dynamics of a Market 
A particularly well suited stochastic model for our purposes are Polya-urns. Sup- 
pose an urn of infinite capacity with I< = 2 types of balls. In t = 1 we have a 
certain positrive number ni ,  12;  of balls of each type in the urn. The  system evolves 
according to the rule: consider the proportion of balls in the urn. A new ball 
of a certain type is added to the urn with a probability that is a given function 
of the proportion of balls in the urn. Following [5, 13, 141 we call this function 
an  urn function. In the simples case this function is an identity function, i.e. 
the probability that a new ball is of a, certain type equals the proportion of this 
type.15. This case is referred to as the standard Polya-process. 
The framework of Polya-urns has been extended in a number of papers16 in 
that the urn function is not restricted to be the identity function but can take 
a.ny sha.pe and a numl~er  of arguments (i.e. types of balls) that can be greater 
than 2 under the conditioil that it maps the unit simplex into [O, :I.], i.e. its 
domain is Sk = { S  E R ~ ,  S ;  > 0, c;=~ S ;  = 1) and its range is [0, 11. The function 
then defines the proba.bility to add a ball of a certin type, given the vector of 
proportions s. This approa.ch is referred to as generalized Polya-process. 
The evolution of the proportion in time (the trajectory) depends on random 
events and the lower the number of balls in the urn, the higher the influence 
a new ball atlded can have on the proportion. Thus, early random events can 
determine in which direction the system evolves. A new time step is defined by 
the fact that a ball is added to the urn. With increasing time the proportion of 
balls might exhibit strong convergence where the limit depends on past events. 
Hence the evolution of the trajectories is path dependent. 
The application to  ma.rkets with network externalities is straightforward. Instead 
of dea,ling with an ui-11 we are considering a, market and instead of balls we are 
considering technologies. A new buyer is making a decision according to the 
process describeti I;, .,ection 2.1, i.e. 1le ohserves market share$ a::d rjri*-ol of the 
products. 'l'hen he decides in a way that appears random to us. Wiin h ~ s  decision 
he "adds a product to the market" and thus exerts an influence on the preference 
15This is tha case that has been analyzed by Eggenberger and Polya in their paper of 1923. 
See 1161. 
16See Ai.thur, Dosi, E~.,noliev and Iyaniovski, 13, 5, 13, 141. 
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structure of the next 1)uyer. The following section ilustrates this process. 
3.2 Two hypotlletical share-response ftmctions 
In Section 2.1 we argued that firms change the price of their products as market 
shares cllange. Let us assume that firms base their price settings on their average 
cost17 such that the minimum price of the product equals its average costs. More- 
over, assuine that with increasing market share firms can extend their production 
capacity and hence they experience a sinking long-term average cost function". 
Firms whose products have passed a certain market share might decide to use 
their market power to increase their prices and hence to obtain profits. If they 
do so, this price increase changes the hehaviour of the feedback on the market. 
To describe the price response to mar1;et share we suggest two hypothetical 
shal-e-i.esporzse f~~izctioizs. 
where a ,  b, c are constants. Equation (7) describes the behaviour of the firm if they 
simply lower the price ivitll nlarket share, ecluation (8) describes the behaviour 
if firms increase the price beyond a critical market share. Figures 1 and 2 give a 
graphical representation of these functions. The following ailalyses will be based 
on these f~~nctions.  
4 Emerging relative demand functions 
Let us illustrate the cliscl~ssioil of section 2 with a hypothetica,l market where 
three goods compete. Since always 
"Let us also assuine t,hat these average cost include "normal profit.", i.e. the opportunity 
cost,s of production. 
l 8~1 le  model to he presented in this paper is intrinsically dynamic. Since the production 
structure, hence costs, is subject t.o change with time we consider the long-term average cost 
function. For a discussion of this function see e.g. Val-zan [21]. 
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Figure 1: Plot of hypothetical share-response function (7) ( a  = 0.5) 
Figure 2: Plot of hypothetical share-response function (8) (b  = 0.5, c = 5) 
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Figure 3: Graphical represelltation of the clomaiil T2 of a relative demand function 
of a marliet where three goods compete. 
we can reduce the relative denland function (3) to a function of I< - 1 factors 
in = {s E R"-', s, > 0, ~:!.'s, 5 1). In the case of three goods we can 
express function (3) e.g. as a function of s l  and s2. The function is defined for 
0 5 sl + 5 2  < 1, s1, s2 > 0. Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of the 
domain T2. 
4.1 Firins respond to illcreasing market share with de- 
creasing prices 
Let us assume that all firms behave as described in equation (7). Since the relative 
demand function (equation (3)) is now a function in T2 we write 
where s = (s l ,  s2 )  and O < sl + s.2 < 1. Rearranging yields 
Figure 4 plots this function for a = l , p  = -1. From (6) we conclude that the 
limit l~ehaviour of the stochastic process (5 )  can be similar to the ones of the 
4 Emerging relative demand functions 
Figure 4: Emerging relative demand fullctioil given response function (7) and 
p =  -1,a = 1 
following deterministic systein of ordinary differential equationslg 
The possible attractors of this system are given by the solutions of the nonlinear 
equations 
J,(s) - S1 = O,  ( i2 (~)  - s2 = 0. (12) 
Let s* be a solutioil of the set of equations (12). We know from the results 
on unattainability of unstable that if s* is a solution of (12) and the 
Jacobian J(s*) of (11) has an eigenvalue with positive real part then the process 
(5) converges to s* with probability 0. 
To investigate the convergence of the market we need further assumptions. 
To clarify the impact of different parameter constelltions let us consider some 
particular cases. Suppose that a = 1, i.e. a one per-cent increase in market 
share llleans that the demand for the procluct increases also at one per-cent21. 
CVe show that ( ~ i  [lifTe~.erit price elasticltes p (namely p - 0, p = ---I snrl p -= 0.5) 
the market dynamics exhibit different behaviour. 
lgSee also Arthur et al. [ 5 ] .  
''See Arthur, Errnolieu, Iiaiziovski [GI 
?lSo far we do not have any empirical studies that deal with the issue of response to market 
share and thus no estimates of a. In ally way, prevailing network externalities imply a > 0. 
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Table 1: Ecluilibrium points and their hehaviour for a relative demand function 
for a n~arl<et where t , l~ree goods compete given decreasing price with increasing 
market share and p = -1 
Equilibrium points 
sl = 1, s~ = 0, ( s3  = 0) 
sl = 0, sa = 1, ( s 3  = 0) 
sl = 0, s2 = 0, ( s 3  = 1) 
1 1 
sl = 2, s2 = 5 ,  ( s 3  = 0) 
1 S 1  = $, S a  = 0, (5.3 = -) 2 
1 1 
sl = 0, sz = 5 ,  ( s 3  = ?)  
1 
sl = -,  3 s2 = 1, 3 ( s 3  = &) 
1. Suppose the coilsumers are indifferent with respect to prices, i.e. p = 0. 
Then the preference funct,ion degenerates to dl; (s) = sl;. We that the 
shares converge wit11 prohaility one in this case. The  limit has a Dirichlet- 
distribution with tlle density function 
behuviour 
attracting 
attracting 
attracting 
saddle 
saddle 
repelling 
wit11 12:) n;, 72; >_ 1. n:, ? I ; ,  7%; are initial numbers of halls (technologies) 
and c is a. normalizing constant that depends on this initial numbers. If' 
n: = 12; = 12; = 1 the limit distribution is unform on T2. 
2. Suppose that a one per-cent increase in price of one of the products implies 
that the demand for this product decreases at  one per-cent i.e. p = -1. 
Inserting p and solving the set of equations (12) we get the set of fixed points 
that are shown in Table 1 (once an equilibrium point (s;, s l )  is computed, 
the corresponding value for s; can he identified through the symmetricity 
of the functions dl (.), d2(.)  and d 3 ( - ) ) .  
L'o checl< the stability of t h ~ , ( -  i-ixed-*, .lnt r .J~,_plzte the eigendluez 
of the Jacobi-matrix of each point ( the second column of Table 1 shows 
the stability behaviour of each of the equilibrium points). The  system 
possesses attracting equilibrium points at  the corners (i.e where one sl; = l ) ,  
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Figure 5: Emerging relative demand function given response function (7) and 
p = 0.5, a = 1 
it llas a repelling equilibium point in ( , ) and three saddle points in 
(0,0.5), (0.5,0), (0.5,0.5). 
An identification of fixed points of the deterministic system is not sufficient 
to  assess the limit beha.viour of the stochastic system. However, we know23 
that if we can identify a Lyapunov function for the system, it converges 
with probability 1 to  a random vector whose support belongs to  the set of 
fixed points. A Lyapunov function for system (11) is given in the Appendix. 
We conclude that given function (9) and (p, a) = (- 1, I ) ,  the market con- 
verges with probability one to a random vector taking a t  most three values 
(1,0,0), (0,1,0) and (0 ,0 ,1 ) .2~ur the rmore ,  we can that each of these 
values is attained with positive probability for any initial set of numbers 
n:, n i ,  n:. 
3. Suppose that tlle demand is increasing by 0.5% if the price is increasing by 
l % ,  hence p = 0.5. It might be not very probable that demand increases 
wit!: price Nevertheless we discuss thi - c a e  since there is no empirical 
evidence on price response in markets of high-tech commodities. Figure 5 
23See Arthur et al. [7] 
'"This follows from the eigenvalues of the Jacobi-matrix. For a proof see Arthur, Ermolieu 
and Ii'aniouski [7], p. 191-195 
"For a proof See Arthur, Ermolieu and Icaniouski [4]. 
4 Emerging relative demaizd fu~zcfioizs 
Table 2: Equilibrium points and their behaviour for a relative demand function 
for a market where three goods compete given decreasing price with increasing 
market share and p = 0.5 
Equilibriun~. points 
sl = 1 ,  s? = 0 ,  (s3 = 0 )  
sl = 0 ,  s2 = 1, (s3 = 0 )  
sl = 0 ,  s2 = 0 ,  (s3 = 1 )  
1 1 
sl = y,  s2 = 5,  (s3 = 0 )  
I S 1  = -,  s 2 = 0 ,  ( s g  = 
2 ) 
1 1 
s l = 0 , ~ 2 = ~ , ( ~ ~ = ~ )  
1 
sl = -,  3 s? = 1, 3 (s3 = 5 )  
gives a plot of the relative demand function (equation (3))  given a = 1 and 
p = 0.5. Table 2 shows the equilibrium points in that case. 
behaviour 
repelling 
repelling 
repelling 
saddle 
saddle 
saddle 
attracting 
The equilibrium points are identical to those in the previous case. However 
their characteristics have changed. The  only attracting equilibrium point 
of the cleternlinistic system is given by sl = s 2  = s3 = i. In this case (as for 
the case of p > 0 in general) we cannot identify a Lyapunov function, hence 
we have no proof that st converges with probability 1 to this point. We 
know however that  each of the attracting equilibrium points of the deter- 
ministic system are attained with positive probability for any initial value 
IZ:, ni ,  Also a silllulation study based on Polya-urn processes suggests 
that  the stochastic system converges to the attracting equilibrium point of 
the deterministic system, Thus, for the given parameter constellation only 
the point (i, i, 8) is attained in the liinit with positive p r ~ b a b i l i t y . ~ ~  
4.2 Firins respond to increasing market share with a mixed 
strategy 
I,et 11s assume t.!le.t all firnlr, behave a,. described in equatior~ (8), i.e they lower 
their prices with increasiilg market share when their market share is low but 
beyond a certain critical share they use their market power to increase prices 
""For a proof See Arthur, Ernlolieu and Iianiovski [4]. 
'7Since we canllot exclude cycles in this case the probability of attaining this point can be 
less than 1. 
4 Emerging relative demand fu12cti012s 
Figure 6: Emerging relative demand function given response function (8) and 
p =  - l , a =  1 
and llence increa.se their profits. The relative demand function (3) in this case 
is of course more complex. Again, let us analyze the situation for three different 
values of p. 
1. For p = 0 the situation is identical to the one discussed in the previous 
sector, i.e. the limit has a Dirichlet-distribution on the unit simplex. 
2. Let p = -1. Figure 6 gives a graphical presentation of this function for 
b = 0.5 and c = 3 . The equilibrium points of this function are given in Table 
3. If the share-response function is inore complex, the relative demand 
function becomes of course also more complex. For this case we could not 
find a Lyapunov function. Again, we can only state, that the attracting 
equilibrium points of the deterministic system are attained with positive 
probability. However, numerical simulations suggest that the stochastic 
system does not converge to limit cycles, i.e. it converges indeed to the 
attracting equilibrium points of the deterministic system. Figure 7 shows 
the outcome of thiq simulation study i.e the distribution of market sh2res 
at, I - 100. 
There are two interesting phenomena to observe if we compare these equi- 
librium points to those that emerge under function (7), given in Table 1. 
First, we obtain six further equilibrium points. These points are deter- 
mined by the intersection points of f(s l)  and f (sz) given s3 = 0 (and 
4 Emerging relative demand functions 
Table 3: Equilibrium points their behaviour of a relative demand function for a 
market where three goods compete given share-response function (8) and p = -1 
others symmetrically).28 We see from the eigenvalues of the Jacobian that 
these points a.re saddle points of the system, i.e. the system might first 
evolve to these points and from there to attracting fixed points. Secondly, 
the point (f , 2 ,  0) and its permutatitions are now attracting equilibrium 
points. This implies that they are now attained in the limit with positive 
probability (e.g. from a situation with initially equal market shares i.e. 
from the point (Q, f ,  f )  which is unstable). Hence the system converges 
with positive probability to a state where either two technologies share the 
market or one technology takes the whole market. 
3. Let p = 0.5. As in the case of the simple share-response function the 
equilibrium points are the same, but cha~lge their character with changing 
sign of the pice elasticity p, i.e. repelling fixed points become attracting 
and vice versa. Saddle points keep t,heir behaviour. Hence, we can identify 
the dynamics of the systen-i rhrough T ~ ~ b l e  3, inverting the klehagiour of the 
equilibrium points. Figure 8 gives a plot of the relative demand function 
"Let s3 = 0 then f ( s l )  and f (s?)  have three intersection points: one at (i, i) and two more 
which depend on the parameters b and c. By synlmetry we achieve similar results for sl = 0 of 
Sa = 0. 
5 Suinmnry aizd Outlook 
Figure 7: Emerging distribution of market share at t = 100 as outcome of 450 
simulatioil runs. The share-function is (S): p = -1, a = 1 and ni = ni = n: = 1 
for a = 1 and p = 0.5. We see that only the vector (i, :, $) is attained 
in the limit with positive probability. Figure 9 illustrates the emerging 
distribution of marlcet shares by nleans of simulation study. 
We see that the dynamics of the system is now inverse compared to the 
case where p = -1 (see Figure 7). Tlle system converges with positive 
1 1 1  . probability to (, 2, ,), 1.e. a situation where the market is divided at 
equal share among the three goods. 
5 Summary and Outlook 
This paper is dealing with markets where network externalities prevail. To do 
so, we specified a, demand function and defined the conditianal probabilities of 
buying a certain technology via a relative demand function. We then made dif- 
ferent, llypotheses cn tkle price setting hehav io~~ t  of the firms with respect to the 
market share of their product. This approach allows us to identify the dynamics 
and limit states of these markets. We illustrated this for a market where three 
goods colnpete under different constellations of parameters that determine the 
demand for these goods. We see from that exercise that network externalities are 
a sufficient condition for increasing returns. 
5 Summary a n d  Outlook 
Figure S: Emerging relative demand function given response function (S) and 
p = O..5, a = 1 
Figure 9: Emerging distribution of market share at t = 100 as outcome of 450 
simulation runs. The share-function is (8), p = 0.5, a = 1 and n,: = ni = ni = 1 
Appendix 19 
The specification of the deinaild function and the relative demand function 
should allow for empiri~a~l  investigation of markets where network externalities 
prevail. An econometric estimation of p and o of a certain market could be a 
step towards an investigation of the evolution of shares in this market. 
Appendix: A Lyapunov function for system (11) 
A function L = L(s l ,  s 2 , .  . . , s ~ , - - ~ )  is a Lyapunov function of a system of differen- 
- 
tial equations ik = dk(s1, ~ 2 , .  .  , SI,--I), k = (1,2, .  . . , I{ - 1) defined on an open 
set TI,--1 if 
I,- i)L(s) - 
XT d k ( ~ )  > 0 V S ~  E TIC-1 and s = ( s l , s 2 , .  . . ,sI,.-~) E TI,--1. (13) k= 1 
For system(l1) given relative demand function (10) we define the following Lya- 
punov function: 
L(s) = ( ~ 1 ) ~  t ( ~ 2 ) ~  t (1 - s1 - ~ 2 ) ~  (14) 
To prove that this function is a Lya.punov function, we set 
If we multiply the right side of the differential equation (11) with a positive term 
its phase portrait does not change2'. Thus, to obtain a function easier to handle 
we achieve by multiplying the right side by (s; $ s; $ (1 - sl - ~ 2 ) ~ )  
lrlserting this functions in equation (13) yields a polynomial g(sl ,  s 2 )  of degree 4 
in sl and s2 .  A plot of g(s l ,  s2)  suggests that this polynomial has roots for all 
equilibrium points identified in Table 1 (see Figure l o ) ,  hence that condition (13) 
holds on the simplex TI,--1. To proof this we show 
"See [15], section 12.4. 
Appendix  
Figure 10: Graphical representation of condition (13) given Lyapunov function 
(14) 
i )  t11a.t (13) holds on the boundary of the simplex, i.e. for sl = 0 or s2 = 0 or 
(1 - S l  - s2) = 0. 
i i )  that it holds for all local minima in the interior. 
ad i )  Consider the case sl = 0. Then g(sl ,  s2) reduces to a polynomial in sz. It 
is zero at the unique 1oca.l minimum (0.5,0.5) as well as in the boundary 
points s 2  = 0 and s2 = 1. Hence condition (13) holds if sl = 0. The other 
cases follow by symmetry. 
ad i i )  A straighforward calculation shows that g ( s l ,  sz) has only one local mini- 
inum (s;, s;) in the interior of the simplex and that g(s;, s;) = 0. 
Thus, since g ( s l ,  s2) >_ 0 holds for all points on the boundary of the simplex and 
for all local minima in the interior, it holds on the whole simplex. 
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